This is a collection of twenty-four articles evenly divided among five topical areas: skepticism, sensory perception, memory, self-knowledge, and the foundations of empirical knowledge. With the exception of an article by Meinong, all the selections belong to the twentieth century and, except for four other articles, to the past thirty years. The selections in each of the five parts compliment one another in content and are arranged chronologically. For example, the section entitled "Contemporary Skepticism" begins with Leonard Nelson’s "The Impossibility (...) of the ‘Theory of Knowledge'," moves into Moore’s early criticism and Lehrer’s recent defense of skepticism, examines Quine’s attempt to convert epistemology into psychology, and concludes with Rozeboom’s "Why I Know So Much More Than You Do." A similar format is followed in each of the other four sections. Many of the selections have never before appeared in an anthology. For example, the valuable Reichenbach-Goodman-Lewis 1952 debate on phenomenalism and the foundations of knowledge appears in its entirety. (shrink)

Lehrer examines the conditions traditionally held to be necessary and jointly sufficient for warranting empirical knowledge claims. Chapter 1 is a summary of some of the current literature regarding knowledge claims and whether knowledge is synonymous with true justified belief. Chapters 2 and 3 respectively deal with the truth and belief conditions, with Lehrer adopting a modified version of the semantic theory. He also briefly discusses, then rejects, the correspondence theory, noting the usual problems concerning "correspondence" and "fact." He also (...) rejects the identification of a theory of truth with a theory of justification, given that justification for Lehrer is no guarantee of truth and that a justified belief may be causally independent of evidence. This is in sharp contrast with the instrumentalist definition of truth as warranted assertability. Unfortunately, there is no discussion of the pragmatic theory of truth in this book. Chapters 4-6 examine and reject the Foundation Theory, according to which there is a set of self-evident or basic statements which constitute the foundation for justifying all non-basic or inferential statements. (shrink)

The position taken in this book is that built into every epistemology is a theory concerning the origins of knowledge and the relation between cognition, perception, and action ; accordingly, the basic issues of epistemology are resolvable by the psychological/scientific study of these cognitive and perceptual processes ; such studies show the empirical inadequacy of some theories of knowledge and the validity of others. In support of Piaget refers to his many familiar studies on the conservation principle, causality, transitivity, and (...) so on. Given such studies, phenomenalism is rejected because it presupposes that sensory experience and cognitive activity are sharply distinguishable levels or stages in the knowledge process. An experimental or genetic epistemology can therefore adjudicate between rival theories of knowledge given that epistemological issues are in fact empirical issues in disguise. (shrink)

A collection of eighteen essays by leading contemporary philosophers concerning the nature and function of philosophy in today’s world. These essays represent Ordinary Language Philosophy, Existentialism, Marxism, Idealism, Pragmatism, the Philosophy of Science, the History of Philosophy, and Philosophical Anarchism. With the exception of six papers, all were expressly written for this volume.